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Malevolent creativity (MC), or intending to inflict harm in original ways, is an aspect of
creativity that has received little empirical attention. It reasons that generating
malevolently creative products in response to a problem is dependent upon individual
differences and environmental factors, especially with regard to the social and
emotional content of a particular problem. A personality variable strongly associated
with how individuals acknowledge and respond to such social and emotional content is
emotional intelligence (EI). Individuals with higher EI often solve problems in
cooperative, beneficial, and positive ways, which seems contrary to solving a problem
with MC. In addition to testing whether EI is negatively related to MC in general, we
analyzed whether that negative relationship would persist even after controlling for
cognitive ability and task effects. Those questions were examined across two studies.
Results suggest that individuals with lower EI are more likely to respond to different
types of problems with increased instances of MC even when the social or emotional
content of those problems are factored out. The implications and limitations of these
studies, as well as future directions for the study of MC, are discussed.
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Creativity is often defined in terms of ideas and products that are original and
valuable, especially if they are socially valuable (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988).
However, consider ideas and products that are original but not socially valuable, or
rather ideas that attempt to solve problems in original and harmful ways.
Malevolent creativity (MC) is defined as creativity that deliberately leads to
harmful or immoral results (Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2008). The related construct
of negative creativity allows for creativity to accidentally lead to undesirable outcomes
(James, Clark, & Cropanzano, 1999). We believe that the definition of MC may be too
broad, and for the purposes of this paper we would like to expand on a definition of
creativity offered by Plucker, Beghetto, and Dow (2004). They define creativity as “the
interaction among aptitude, process, and environment by which an individual or group
produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social

context” (p. 90)—to which we add “that are intended to materially, mentally, or
physically harm oneself or others.”
Examples of MC include original instances of terrorism, spreading rumors, theft,
spying, abuse, suicide, aggressive humor, and counterproductive work behaviors. Note
that MC is not synonymous with any of those acts by themselves—although most of
those examples are necessarily harmful, they are not always original.
The “dark side” of creativity has garnered much interest in recent years (e.g.,
Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010). For example, attention is being given to
the application of creativity in criminal activities and lawbreaking (Eisenman, 2008;
Cropley & Cropley, 2011). Likewise, empirical evidence supports the notion that
individuals who are better divergent thinkers are more creative liars (Walczyk, Runco,
Tripp, & Smith, 2008) and creative individuals are more likely to be dishonest
(Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2012; De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Gino & Ariely, 2012).
However, empirical research on the construct of MC is rather limited. Clark and James
(1999) found that individuals will respond to unjust situations with MC. Situational justice
was manipulated in their study through the use of lottery tickets. Participants were
instructed to perform a mundane task and were told they would receive one to six lottery
tickets that would go toward a $50 raffle, depending on their performance. Participants
in the just condition received all six tickets whereas participants in the unjust condition
received no tickets. After participants either received or did not receive their tickets,
each participant responded to two problem-solving tasks. One task instructed
participants to generate creative ways of raising funds for a nonprofit organization that
was having financial problems; this problem was framed to be positive and beneficial.
The other task instructed participants to generate creative ways of clandestinely giving a
potential client defaming information about a competitor; this problem was framed to be
negative and harmful. Ideas were deemed negatively (malevolently) creative if they
were original solutions offered in response to the negative problem, and ideas were
deemed positively creative if they were original solutions offered in response to the
positive problem. Participants in the fair condition were more positively creative and
participants who perceived their treatment to be unfair were more negatively creative.
This study therefore offers evidence that MC is a genuinely distinct construct from
creativity, and also that MC can be influenced by situational factors.
Lee and Dow (2011) found that certain individual differences are related to the
number of malevolently creative ideas generated in response to divergent thinking
tasks. The two tasks were to generate ideas for the uses of a brick or a pencil.
Specifically, the results indicated that males were more malevolently creative than
females, trait physical aggression positively related to MC, and conscientiousness was
negatively related to MC. Ideas were deemed malevolently creative if they were harmful
in some way, such as using a brick as a weapon. These results suggest that individual
differences—specifically gender, trait physical aggression, and conscientiousness— can
relate to one’s ability or propensity to generate malevolently creative ideas.

Kaufman, Cropley, Chiera, and White (2012) studied how people perceive acts
of varying malevolence. They presented many possible responses to scenarios that
ranged in their degree of goodness versus evil (i.e., from peaceful protests to bombs).
Kaufman et al. (2012) found that people believed morally complex or ambiguous actions
to be more creative than more straightforward actions (either benevolent or malevolent).
These studies offer evidence that MC not only exists, but is also affected by
situational factors and individual differences. However, the operationalizations of MC in
the studies by Clark and James (1999) and Lee and Dow (2011) were problematic.
Clark and James (1999) operationalized MC as an original solution offered in response
to a negatively oriented problem, whereas Lee and Dow (2011) operationalized MC as a
harmful idea offered in response to a divergent thinking task. We believe that
operationalizing MC in those ways is not ideal. In the case of Clark and James (1999), it
is possible that negatively oriented problems can be responded to in positive, albeit
original, ways, which would not constitute being original in harmful ways. Similarly,
positively oriented problems can be responded to in negative ways that are also
original. Likewise, in the case of Lee and Dow (2011), just because an idea is harmful
does not mean it is original. We therefore believe MC should be operationalized as an
idea or solution that is both original and harmful.
MC is probably influenced by factors that affect how individuals interact with
others and how socially oriented problems are solved. As evidenced by Lee and Dow
(2011), MC is likely related to certain personality variables. A personality variable that
might relate to MC, and also influences how people respond to social interactions and
social-oriented problems, is emotional intelligence.
Emotional Intelligence
Emotional intelligence (EI) is defined as the ability to process one’s own and
others’ emotions, or in other words the ability to tend to, understand, use, and manage
emotions (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004, 2008). People higher in EI can
acknowledge, understand, and control their emotions better than people lower in EI
(Fulmer & Barry, 2004). That emotional control may affect how problems are responded
to; people with higher EI are more likely to respond to problems in positive and
collaborative ways, whereas people with lower EI are more likely to respond to
problems in negative or avoidant ways, both at the individual (Jordan & Troth,
2002a,2002b; Morrison, 2008) and team (Ayoko, Callan, & Härtel, 2008; Jordan &
Troth, 2004) levels.
Children and adolescents with higher EI have been rated by their peers as more
cooperative and less aggressive and were rated by teachers as more prosocial
(Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, & Bakker, 2007; Petrides, Sangareau, Furnham, &
Frederickson, 2006). Lower EI was found to be related to problem and deviant
behaviors, and poor interpersonal relationships (Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Siu,
2009). EI was also found to be related to coping styles, with high EI being positively

related to adaptive coping styles but negatively related to maladaptive coping styles
(Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009).
Several studies have explored the relationship between EI and creativity. EI was
found to be related to higher readiness to create and innovate in a sample of employees
from various organizations in the United Arab Emirates (Suliman & Al-Shaikh, 2007). In
addition, Wolfradt, Felfe, and Köster (2002) found that self-perceived emotional
intelligence, particularly a facet called emotional self-efficacy, positively related to
creative performance and self-perception of creativity. Sánchez-Ruiz, HernándezTorrano, Pérez-González, Batey, and Petrides (2011) also found that creative
performance positively relates to EI. Finally, individuals with higher EI might prefer
thinking styles that are more complex and creative (Murphy & Janeke, 2009). However,
Ivcevic, Brackett, and Mayer (2007) did not find a significant relationship between EI
and creativity. In those studies, creativity was divided into cognitive creativity and
behavioral creativity. Cognitive creativity was operationalized with both a divergent
thinking (consequences) task and the Remote Associates Test. Behavioral creativity
was operationalized based on self-reported scales of artistic activity and artistic
expression and appreciation. Overall, an individual’s creativity might be positively
related to, or even influenced by, his or her own EI only in certain contexts, especially
socially oriented contexts with emotionally laden content.
Rationale for Study 1
As evidenced in the reviewed literature, people with higher EI often approach and
solve socially oriented problems in positive ways. On the other hand, people who solve
problems with the use of MC likely do so with the intent to harm others in some way.
Although EI has been found to be positively related to creativity, the kind of creativity
assessed in previous studies can be likened to positive or benevolent creativity. EI, a
construct largely associated with prosocial and beneficial outcomes, is likely negatively
related to MC, a construct largely associated with aggressive and harmful outcomes.
Individuals probably solve socially oriented problems based on, and in response
to, the social and emotional content of the situation in which that problem is posed.
Because of the positive ways in which people high in EI likely frame their social worlds,
and the aggressiveness and negative cognitions that are likely required to respond to
problems in malevolently creative ways, we think that EI negatively relates to MC even
after social and emotional content is factored out. However, EI is a type of intelligence,
and creativity is positively associated with cognitive intelligence. To further parcel out
the strength of the relationship between EI and MC, we wanted to test that effect above
and beyond cognitive ability. We hypothesize that EI is negatively related to MC even
when controlling for cognitive ability and the specific content of a socially oriented
problem-solving task.

Study 1
Method

Participants. One hundred ninety-two students from a Midwestern university
received extra credit for participating in the study, with 65 males (34%) and 127 females
(66%) having a mean age of 22.56 (SD = 5.00).
Procedure. Undergraduate students signed up to participate in this study in
exchange for extra credit for their classes. When participants arrived in the designated
testing room, they were given an informed consent sheet to read and sign. They were
then given one of the three problem vignettes and were asked to generate as many
solutions as possible in response to the problem they received. They then completed
the BarOn EQ-I test and filled out a demographic survey. All materials were
administered in paper-and-pencil format. Participants were then debriefed, thanked for
their time, and assured that they would receive extra credit for their participation.
Measures.
Problem-solving task. Each participant generated multiple solutions in
response to one of three randomly presented problems. The problems pertained to
Sally, Brian, and ACME. Sally is a timid new student to a college and is assigned a
roommate, who smokes marijuana, which makes Sally uncomfortable. However, despite
her timidity, she is afraid that the situation will escalate if nothing is done about her
roommate’s behavior. Brian is an up-and-coming manager at a large bank who hired a
friend’s sister into his department. Although Brian’s friend highly recommended his
sister and she gets along well with coworkers, her work and meeting attendance have
been substandard. Brian also has to consider that a majority of the employees in his
department are men. Finally, ACME has an engineering department that has recently
seen increased turnover and decreased productivity. Head-hunters are enticing
potential engineers away from ACME, and the department has a hold on wage
increases to a particular percentage. All three problems have been used in previous
studies (e.g., Reiter-Palmon, Illies, Cross, Buboltz, & Nimps, 2009).
The three problems differed in their social and emotional content, likely due to
the different values elicited within each problem (i.e., values and beliefs about smoking
pot, handling troublesome employees, or the appropriate means by which to financially
revive an organization). Sixty-four participants responded to Sally’s problem, 62
participants responded to Brian’s problem, and 66 participants responded to ACME’s
problem.
Emotional intelligence. The measure of EI used in this study was the BarOn
EQ-I test (Bar-On, 1997). The measure contains 133 items with a 5-point response
scale (1= very seldom or not true of me, 5 = very true of me or true of me). Bar-On
(1997) found that the test–retest reliability of this scale was .85 after 1 month and .75
after 4 months. Using Cronbach’s alpha, the reliability of the composite measure in this
study was .96.
Cognitive ability. Self-reported college GPA has been found to be an adequate
proxy measure for cognitive ability (Mumford, Supinski, Baughman, Costanza, &

Threlfall, 1997). As such, self-reported college GPA was used to measure cognitive
ability.
Solution ratings. Solutions to the problems were rated for originality and
negativity. A solution’s originality was determined by how unique it was, how
imaginative or humorous it was, and how structured it was by the problem. Originality
was rated by two trained raters using a 6-point Likert-type scale. Each rater first scored
the solutions individually, and then they reached consensus on their ratings (e.g.,
Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009). Solutions rated a 1, 2, or 3 were unoriginal, with 1 being
very unoriginal, and solutions rated a 4, 5, or 6 were original, with 6 being very original.
A solution was deemed original if it had a score higher than a 3.
A solution’s negativity was determined by its harmful nature. A positive solution
was one that attempted to solve the problem without using physical or mental harm
against oneself or another party, including organizations, groups, or other individuals.
On the other hand, a negative solution was one that attempted to solve the problem
through the use of physical or mental harm to oneself or another party. Note that this
rating is only for the negativity (i.e., harmfulness) of a solution, not its negative creativity.
The negativity of the solutions was rated by using the Positivity versus Negativity
Solution Evaluation Scale (PNSES), a rating scale created specifically for this study.
The PNSES, like the originality scale, was used by two trained raters. The raters judged
the solutions in three steps. First, the raters placed each solution into either a “positive”
category or a “negative” category so as to have maximum agreement. Second, the
raters gave each solution a score from the 6-point scale, with 1 being highly positive
and 6 being highly negative. Third, and as with the originality ratings, the raters were
asked to reach consensus regarding their ratings. A solution was deemed negative if it
had a score higher than a 3.
After the solutions were rated on originality and negativity, those two scores were
evaluated together to determine whether a solution was malevolently creative. A
solution was deemed malevolently creative if it was both negative and original. The
main dependent variable of this study was the number of malevolently creative solutions
generated by each participant.
Results and Discussion
The correlations and descriptive statistics for GPA, EI, and the number of
malevolently creative solutions generated are presented in Table 1. The positive
correlation between MC and GPA, although marginally significant (r = .12, p = .065),
suggests that there might be a relationship of some sort between cognitive ability and
MC deserving further attention. The negative correlation between EI and MC, also
marginally significant (r = - .11, p = .076), partially supports our hypothesis that people
with higher EI generate fewer malevolently creative ideas. To test our hypothesis we
used hierarchical multiple regression predicting number of malevolently creative
solutions from GPA, problem type, and EI (see Table 2). Both control variables (GPA

and problem type) were found to be significant. EI was found to be marginally significant
in predicting the number of malevolently creative solutions generated while controlling
for cognitive ability and problem type (β = - .15, p = .064). Because of the marginal
significance and small effect size of the relationship of interest, these results offer partial
support for our hypothesis that EI is negatively related to MC even when controlling for
cognitive ability and the specific content of a socially oriented problem-solving task.

These results suggest that someone lower in EI might be more likely to generate
malevolently creative solutions than someone higher in EI. It is important to note that EI,
a construct seemingly dependent upon the social and especially emotional content of
situations, predicted MC even after controlling for that content. These results indicate
that EI may be related to MC not only because of the social and emotional content of a
problem, but for other reasons as well. We therefore conducted a second study to test
whether EI was also negatively related to MC even in response to a nonsocial, nonemotional task.
Study 2
Method
Participants. Seventy-nine students from a Midwestern university received extra
credit for participating in the study, with 33 males (42%) and 46 females (58%) having a
mean age of 24.50 (SD = 7.37).
Procedure. Undergraduate students signed up to participate in this study in
exchange for extra credit for their classes. When participants arrived in the designated
testing room, they were given an informed consent sheet to read and sign. They were
then given two divergent thinking tasks and were instructed to generate as many ideas
as possible or to be as original as possible when generating ideas to the tasks.
Participants then completed an EI measure and filled out a demographic survey. All
materials were administered in paper-and-pencil format. Participants were then
debriefed, thanked for their time, and assured that they would receive extra credit for
their participation.
Measures.
Divergent thinking task. Each participant generated multiple ideas for two
divergent thinking tasks— generating uses for a brick and a shoe. When generating
ideas to those two tasks, participants received instructions to either generate as many

ideas as possible or to be as original as possible. Thirty-nine participants responded to
the tasks according to the instructions that emphasized generating as many ideas as
possible, whereas 40 participants responded to the tasks according to the instructions
that emphasized generating as many original ideas as possible. Each participant’s ideas
were combined across the two tasks because no significant differences were found
between how participants responded to the uses for a brick versus a shoe.
Emotional intelligence. The measure of EI used in this study was developed by
Schutte et al. (1998). The measure contains 33 items with a 5-point response scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Across various studies, those authors found that
the scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 and a test–retest reliability of .78 after 2 weeks.
A different measure of EI was used in this study for two reasons. First, from a
psychometric perspective, using a different measure can strengthen the generalizability
of the relationship between EI and MC. Second, from a pragmatic perspective, this
measure is much shorter and takes less time to complete than the Bar-On EQ-I
measure. The scale’s reliability in this study was found to be .86.

Cognitive ability. Like the first study, students’ self-reported college GPA was
used as a proxy for cognitive ability.
Idea ratings. Ideas were coded for originality and negativity. Originality was
rated by two trained raters using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = very unoriginal, 5 = very
original). Interrater reliabilities for the originality ratings were adequate for the brick task
(rwg = .82) and the shoe task (rwg = .79). An idea was deemed original if it had an
average rating higher than 3.
The negativity of the ideas was again rated by using the PNSES. The PNSES
was changed to a 5-point Likert-type scale to match the originality scale, and the
valence was reversed (1 = highly negative, 5 = highly positive) because the raters in
Study 1 indicated that such a reversal would facilitate the rating process by having a
negative-to-positive spectrum rather than a positive-to-negative spectrum. Three trained
raters rated the negativity of the ideas. Interrater reliabilities for negativity ratings were

adequate for the brick task (rwg = .81) and the shoe task (rwg = .84). An idea was
deemed negative if it had an average rating lower than 3.
The criteria for establishing a malevolently creative idea were the same from the
first study, and the number of malevolently creative ideas generated was again the
dependent variable of interest.
Results and Discussion
The correlations and descriptive statistics for GPA, EI, and the number of
malevolently creative ideas generated are presented in Table 3. In this study, MC and
GPA were not correlated. However, a negative correlation between EI and MC was also
found in this study (r = - .24, p = .022), which further supports our hypothesis that
individuals with lower EI produce more malevolently creative ideas.
We again used hierarchical multiple regression to test our hypothesis, predicting
the number of malevolently creative ideas from GPA, instructions, and EI (see Table 4).
EI was found to be marginally significant in predicting the number of malevolently
creative ideas generated while controlling for cognitive ability and instructions (β = -.25,
p = .055). These results are even more interesting because EI predicted MC within a
context that had no social problem-solving and was designed to elicit no emotions.
Because of the marginal significance and small effect size, the results offer partial
support for our hypothesis that EI is negatively related to MC even when controlling for
cognitive ability and instructions in a nonsocial, non-emotional task.
General Discussion
These two studies tentatively indicate that EI predicts MC after controlling for
cognitive ability and task effects. The results of the second study in particular suggest
that EI can predict an individual’s MC even in situations that are not social or
emotionally laden. It must be noted that any implications drawn from the results of both
studies must be done so with caution because both regression analyses were
marginally significant with small effect sizes, suggesting only partial support of our
hypotheses. A particular strength of the current investigation, however, is that consistent
effects were found across two very different experimental contexts, which included two
different creativity tasks and two different measures of EI; the relationship between EI
and MC, while weak, may therefore be generalizable to other types of situations. The
results indicate that people lower in EI might be more willing to disclose negative ideas,
do not know such ideas are inappropriate, or perhaps are not concerned with how
others perceive them. If people lower in EI are willing to generate negative solutions for
others to see, then it is possible that those people are willing to act on such negative
ideas.
Theoretically, the results from these two studies offer several points of interest.
First, we have offered further evidence toward strengthening the notion that MC is a
distinct type of creativity. These studies address a new area in the creativity literature

that is deserving of further attention. Second, we have offered a novel and refined
definition and operationalization of MC. We expanded on the definition proposed by
Cropley et al. (2008), defining MC as the interaction among aptitude, process, and
environment by which an individual or group produces novel and useful ideas as
defined within a social context that are intended to mentally, materially, or physically
harm oneself or others (based on Plucker et al., 2004). We combined components
proposed in previous studies and operationalized MC as a product that is both original
and harmful. Those refinements will hopefully allow for more discerning and precise
research in the area of MC. Third, MC has been further explained with regard to a
personality-based antecedent. Finally, our results suggest that the relationship between
EI and MC may not be related to, dependent on, or influenced by the social and
emotional factors of a situation requiring problem-solving.
Practically, these results suggest that EI may allow us to identify people who are
more likely to engage in malevolently creative behaviors. EI may therefore become an
important variable to consider when hiring for certain occupations, such as those that
are high-stress or those in which the utilization and self-knowledge of one’s emotions is
paramount to success and high performance. Similarly, employees with lower EI could
be trained to enhance their EI so as to help minimize the chances of them engaging in
malevolently creative acts. Even troubled students could receive such training; their
increased capacity to recognize and manage their emotions might decrease their
propensity to behave in malevolently creative ways in school.

It must be noted that the originality component of MC is what makes MC
particularly worrisome for employers, perhaps even more so than unoriginal acts of
harm. We suggest this because original instances of harm are novel and therefore more

difficult to anticipate, detect, and respond to. Being unable to anticipate such harmful
behaviors, let alone detect and respond to them, is likely far more damaging to
organizations (with respect to both finances and personnel) than instances of harm that
are easily detectable and can be readily responded to.
Limitations and Future Research
The studies had three main limitations. First, no causal conclusions can be
derived from the current investigation because of its cross-sectional nature, even
though inferring causality makes sense when framing EI as a trait. To offer evidence for
causality, a longitudinal study could be conducted whereby EI and MC are measured at
separate times. Second, the underlying process as to how EI relates to MC, both in
general and when factoring out the cognitive ability and task effects, is unknown. In
particular, nothing is known as to why EI relates to MC.
Third and finally, it is unknown how the results found in the current study
translate to actual behavior; responses to fictitious situations may not be similar to
responses in real life situations (Reis & Gosling, 2010). Participants might have had
fewer inhibitions in offering malevolently creative solutions because the situations they
responded to were fictitious, with no need to strongly consider repercussions or the
consequences of their ideas. It would therefore be important to determine not only why
people generate malevolently creative ideas in the first place, but also the extent to
which responses to fictitious events translate to similar or dissimilar responses in real
life events. In a related sense, self-reported GPA is not the same as actual GPA—
participants may overestimate or inflate their GPA for many possible reasons. The
measures of EI used were more personality-based and have been criticized as not
being reflective of the cognitive aspect of EI (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).
Because the construct of MC is so new, exploring its antecedents and
consequents can take many different directions. However, of highest import is to further
refine how MC is operationalized. Operationalizing MC as an idea that is both original
and harmful instead of just one or the other is a step in the right direction, but it is still
short of fully encapsulating the theoretical complexity of MC. Other operationalizations
could include ratings that are common within the creativity literature, such as flexibility
and elaboration. These additional ratings would provide evidence as to whether different
contexts and goals influence the type and amount of thought put into original and
harmful ideas, as well as any variables that differentially predict complex ideas that are
beneficial and original versus complex ideas that are harmful and original. Another
possible approach would be to use historiometric analysis (e.g., Simonton, 2009). Past
incidents of MC could be studied in terms of personal attributes of those who are more
likely to engage in MC, or in terms of the eventual repercussions of such acts.
Also important is to study how MC relates to varying components of the creative
process. This paper pertained only to idea generation, but future studies could examine
the relationship between MC and problem construction, information searching, idea

evaluation, and idea implementation. Individuals who are planning to be harmful in
some way might frame problems, and weigh goals and constraints, differently than
people who are planning to be beneficial. Similarly, being harmful might require that
individuals seek out information that vastly differs from information sought after when
attempting to be beneficial. The evaluation and implementation of original ideas also
likely depend on whether those ideas are beneficial or harmful.
The next step in research pertaining to MC, with its refined operationalization and
a better understanding of how it relates to the creative process in general, is to
determine which cognitive, affective, or motivational factors influence MC, at both the
individual and team levels. Of particular interest would be to determine whether
“malevolently creative individuals” exist, or rather people who generally seem to
interpret and respond to the world in original, albeit harmful, ways. In the opposite light,
a promising line of research would be to determine which individual differences, like EI,
are negatively associated with MC. For example, our studies could be repeated using
measures from positive psychology. Especially promising are constructs that influence
more positive ways of thinking and framing the world, such as optimistic explanatory
style (Peterson & Steen, 2009). After a nomological network regarding MC has been
fleshed out, the contexts and situational factors that facilitate and promote, or likewise
inhibit and condemn, MC must be elucidated. Knowing those individual differences and
contextual factors could enhance school intervention programs, influence selection
procedures, or even suggest which individuals might be more likely to be violent in
original ways.
Continuing to study MC is crucial for the sake of saving resources such as time
and money, but most importantly to possibly save lives and minimize suffering. If
students or employees, for example, are original enough in their intent to harm, then
they will encounter few or no countermeasures that can subdue or even anticipate their
malevolent behavior. Such a lack of proper anticipation could cost companies millions of
dollars or could likewise result in the loss of lives through extreme violence. Overall, the
study of MC is an area of research that is not getting the attention it deserves,
especially when considering what and who can be saved if MC is appropriately
scrutinized.
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